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ABSTRACT: In this paper we aim - through an ‘experimentally-adapted’ Contingent Valuation survey - 
to look into the attributes of Ghanaians’ willingness-to-pay for green products. This would help us 
addressing two main issues: first, from a theoretical point of view, we shall assess whether Ghanaians 
show a preference towards environmental goods - hence, countering the ‘too poor to be green’ 
argument. Secondly, from a methodological point of view, we shall try to see if the incentive 
compatible CV analysis provides a good measurement of subjects’ willingness-to-pay for 
environmental premium. Our investigation provides an answer to both issues, showing how using an 
incentive compatible experiment produces, in the case of Ghana, reliable results and that Ghanaians 
consistently show that they are willing to pay an extra premium for green products. 
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1. Introduction 
The idea that consumers are among the strongest actors in market economy is as old as the 
study of Economics.1 The idea, however, that consumers also hold power to influence 
production patterns and direct them into being more environmentally-friendly, expressing, 
on the market, their willingness to pay a higher premium for products which generate 
smaller environmental damage has emerged with the rise of the environmental movement in 
the 1970s, gaining momentum only in the last two decades or so.2 For example, it has been 
shown that US consumers may be willing to pay as high as 12 percent more for certified 
wood products, knowing that their purchase will contribute to the conservation or protection 
of forests (Ozanne and Vloskey, 2003).  
 
In order to assess the extra premium that consumers are willing to pay for green products or 
services, which typically have no real markets, environmental economics has developed 
several methods. Among such techniques we can list the hedonic prices method, the travel 
cost method, the contingent valuation (CV) method and the solicitation of the willingness to 
pay (WTP) for an environmental good or service or, alternatively, willingness to accept 
compensation (WTA) for environmental damage or for the loss of an environmental good or 
service.3  
 
In this paper we will tackle this very issue concentrating our attention on less developed 
countries (LDCs). Specifically, we shall consider the Ghanaian case study, trying - through an 
‘experimentally-adapted’ CV survey - to look into the attributes of a group of Ghanaian 
students’ willingness to pay for green products (an organic banana in our case). This study 
shall help us addressing two key questions in our investigation: first, from a theoretical point 
of view, we will try to answer the question whether in our experimental sample there is a 
tendency to value environmental goods or not. Secondly, from a methodological point of 
view, we will try to see if the incentive compatible experimentally-adapted contingent 
valuation analysis (widely used in developed countries) provides a good measurement of 
subjects’ willingness to pay in an LDC. In doing so we will first briefly review the debate on 
environmental issues and less developed countries (section 2). After providing a brief review 
of the core theoretical issues (section 3), we will present a description of the experiment we 
                                                 
1 Hirschman (1970), for example, has divided consumer sanction power over corporate behaviour into three 
types: a positive sanction “loyalty”, a negative sanction “exit” (terminating a business relationship) and “voice” 
(complaining or negative word-of-mouth).  
2 See, for instance, Kinnear and Taylor (1973); Martin and Simintiras (1995); and Prothero and McDonagh 
(1993).  
3 For a more thorough analysis of these methods, see Pearce and Turner (1990). It is worth-noting, though, that 
these techniques are used not only to estimate the value of “greener” market products, but also (and mainly) to 
elicit the value of non-market goods such as a beautiful landscape, clear air or an endangered species.     3
have conducted at the University of Ghana at L e g o n  ( s e c t i o n  4 )  t o  b e  f o l l o w e d  b y  a n  
interpretation of the main results obtained (section 5). Section 6 contains some concluding 
remarks and suggestions for possible extensions of this work. 
 
2 . Environment, contingent valuation and Developing Countries  
An inquiry into the demand for green products (or, more generally, into the issue of 
environmental concern) is quite common in the case of developed countries, where the 
willingness to pay for organic products was often investigated.4 However, in the case of LDCs, 
this field of study does not represent a very attractive research objective. In fact, many studies 
argue that this pattern of demand is very much correlated with the level of socioeconomic 
development (understood in terms of the level of GDP per capita). In other words, the 
assumption is that the demand (and with it, the willingness to pay) for products that are 
associated with more sustainable practices grows hand in hand with income.5 In this context, 
LDCs, where a huge portion of the population is still concerned with everyday survival, are 
not considered an appropriate milieu for the emergence of environmental, or green, 
consumerism.  
 
However, in the last 15 years or so CV has become a common method for the appraisal of 
WTA and WTP of the population in LDCs for improvement/worsening of environmental 
conditions (Carson et al., 1995). Nonetheless, this method - as well as other stated-preference 
techniques - was applied mainly as a tool to elicit local responsiveness to programmed 
projects (usually large infrastructure), policies and regulations.6 One example of such use is 
given by the World Bank that often applies the CV method before financing big 
infrastructural projects such as water supply or sanitation (see, for example, Pattanayak et al., 
2002; Cropper et al., 1999).  
 
Indeed, there are obvious difficulties of various natures which the application of stated-
preference techniques in LDCs presents. It is true that in practical terms, gathering correct 
and valuable information (through polls, surveys, questionnaires or experiments) could be an 
                                                 
4  See, for instance, Gil et al. (2000) for Spain; Boccaletti and Nardella (2000) for Italy, and Cranfield and 
Magnusson (2003) for Canada.  
5 The Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis, which suggests that environmental damage first rises with 
economic growth and then declines, is at the heart of this assumption. According to this hypothesis, 
environmental damage is bound to decline since the increase in economic indicators represents structural 
changes that lead the economy towards more information-intensive practices. This change is coupled with 
growing environmental awareness - associated with post-modern societies - which gives rise to green 
consumerism. See Panayotou (1993), and Dasgupta et al. (2002).  
6 The discussion whether contingent valuation is a valid tool in general is not addressed here. For the criticism 
on the application of CV in both developing and developed countries see Diamond and Hausman (1994); 
Diamond et al. (1993) and Carson et al. (2001).   4
extremely difficult and problematic task to accomplish in such a context.7 Such practical 
concerns are coupled with a logical one, which can be found in the literature on environment 
and developing countries. The argument posed is the following: can we really expect people 
who suffer severe problems of poverty to pay, let’s say, for organic tomatoes, which are quite 
often more expensive?8 In other words, under the logic of ‘too poor to be green’ (as 
poignantly put by Martinez-Alier, 1995), some economists maintain that due to the low 
income level, developing countries’ citizen are not in a position to express a preference for 
environmental goods (see, for instance, Wolf, 2004 or Thurow, 1980). Such view is countered 
by other environmental economist and sociologists who argue that the environmental 
awareness of the population of LDCs should be examined not only in relation to their 
income, but also to their everyday struggles to a better environmental quality (see, for 
instance, Martinez-Alier and Guah, 1997; Martinez-Alier, 1995 or Brechin and Kempton, 
1994). 
 
A prominent aim of this work is hence to test the ‘too poor to be green’ hypothesis by means 
of an experimental analysis. Due to the nature of experiments (which are typically conducted 
among a small group of students), we are aware that our findings could hardly be generalised 
to the whole developing world or even to the single case of Ghana;9 however, we believe this 
is a first step towards an empirical validation of the above discussed theoretical debate.   
 
As already mentioned, information on the willingness to pay of consumers in developing 
countries for goods with more sustainable attributes is quite scarce. As also observed by Ara 
in a study about consumer WTP for organic rice in the Philippines, “a large number of 
consumer surveys on organic agricultural produce as well as food safety have been conducted 
in developed countries, yet the number of studies in developing countries is very limited” 
(Ara, 2003: 2). This observation is true also in the case of Ghana, where there are hardly any 
studies on this question.10 Indeed, organic food production in Ghana is quite limited. 
                                                 
7 For a discussion on the technical difficulties and problems associated with the conduction of CV in developing 
countries, see Whittington (2002). 
8 For instance, in Ghana, our case study, the cost of living is incredibly high in relation to incomes. In a speech 
delivered at the launching of the Trade Union Congress of Ghana in July 1998, the Secretary General of the 
Union declared: “(The) standard of living of the average worker and for that matter the average Ghanaian has 
fallen during the last fifteen years of adjustment. Unemployment has been high [and] real incomes have reduced 
drastically” (see Anyemedu, 2000, and also WEFA, 2001). 
9 Note that the issue of generalising experimental results is a mach debated one. See, for instance Smith (1976), 
Samuelson, (2005), Levitt and List, (2007). 
10 Two exceptions are worth noting in the literature vacuum context: the first is of a study which examined 
consumers’ WTP for tomatoes produced without chemicals. According to the study, which consisted in a 
household survey in various cities throughout Ghana, about 50 percent of urban households were willing to pay, 
on average, 80 percent more for organic food, 10 percent were indifferent and 40 percent believed that a price 
lower by 50 percent would be appropriate10 (IWMI, International Water Management Institute, cited in Danso 
et al., 2002). Other results were obtained by another study on consumer WTP for pesticide-free and germ-free   5
However, it has been steadily growing in the last years and various products (amongst them 
bananas, pineapples, tomatoes, coconuts, etc.), some for local consumption while others for 
export, have followed the organic production protocol to various extents (Scialabba, 2000; 
Willer and Yussefi, 2004). The organic product referred to in this study (bananas) is a case in 
point: VREL (Volta River Estates Limited), the organic bananas producer in Ghana, although 
relatively small, is currently one of the leading agricultural companies in the country and the 
only exporter of organic bananas.11 
 
3. Aim and Methodological Background of the Experiment 
As explained above, we address the issue of poor countries and the environment by means of 
a laboratory incentive compatible  experiment which was conducted at the University of 
Ghana at Legon (Accra) in October 2005. We structured the experiment into two parts; the 
first one, concerned with the elicitation of individuals’ preference functions, serves to control 
for any possible bias generated by the specific cultural setting and religious beliefs of the 
participant. As acknowledged by many scholars, cultural specificity might affect the structure 
of individuals’ preference function (Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992; Ottaviano and Peri, 
2006). Several authors studied the effects of cultural traits on individual behaviours and found 
that culture has significant and direct influence on the determination of individual 
preferences.12  
 
The influence of cultural background upon individual behaviour could be particularly 
relevant in our case where we elicit subjects’ preferences toward green products using the 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism.13 Such elicitation mechanism could be 
perceived by players as a gamble and therefore answers could be biased by cultural adversity 
towards gambling. This issue is particularly relevant in Ghana, where there might be some 
cultural adversity towards gambling due to religious beliefs (this is pertinent mainly in the 
c a s e  o f  t h e  M u s l i m  m i n o r i t y ) .  I n  l i g h t  o f  t h i s  o b s e r v a t i o n ,  s t a r t i n g  o u r  e x p e r i m e n t  b y  
estimating risk aversion is particularly important. Such preliminary estimates would allow us 
to control for any possible cultural bias and therefore address our first research hypothesis: 
 
H1: It is possible to estimate Ghanaians preferences using a lottery incentive scheme and such 
estimates would produce results unaffected by cultural bias. 
                                                                                                                                                              
fresh vegetables. In this case, on average, the sampled consumers in the capital Accra were willing to pay 20 
percent more for a germ-free cabbage and almost 30 percent more for a pesticide-free one (Al-Hassan and Jatoe, 
2005).  
11 See Siaw (2003). Here, it is worth mentioning that 15 percent of the produce is sold in big cities’ markets in 
Ghana (with no particular tag or label) (see VREL’s website).  
12 See, among others, Roth et al. (1991), Burlando and Hey (1997), Bowles (1998), Henrich (2000), Oosterbeek et 
al. (2004), and Alm and Torgler (2006). 
13 We discuss the BDM elicitation mechanism in section 3.1, presenting the empirical properties of such 
mechanism.    6
 
Once having dispensed with any possible bias caused by cultural or religious beliefs, we shall 
move on to the second, and more relevant, part of our experimental investigation, where we 
attempt to estimate individual preferences for green products and more specifically for 
organic bananas. This second part of the experiment will allow us to test our second research 
hypothesis.  
 
H2: Ghanaians display a preference for green products (organic bananas) when compared to 
non-green products.  
 
If proved to be true, this theoretical hypothesis would allow us to infer that Ghanaians do 
have a preference for the environment and that they are willing to pay an extra premium in 
order to preserve it, hence countering the ‘too poor to be green’ argument. However, we 
should bear in mind that our experiment is conducted among a small group of students which 
probably do not represent the average Ghanaian due to the high level of income inequality 
present in the country, hence we shall be very cautious in inferring any generalisation from 
our empirical findings.  
 
3.1 Preference Elicitation: Theoretical Background   
As mentioned in section 2, there are different strategies which are typically employed to 
evaluate peoples’ attitude towards green products, the most prominent approaches being the 
willingness to pay (WTP), i.e. the maximal buying price for a good, and the willingness to 
accept (WTA), i.e. the minimal selling price.14 However, the empirical literature has clearly 
shown that the choice of one approach over another (WTP or WTA) could generate different 
results. More precisely, in experimental studies the WTA is generally much higher than the 
WTP (e.g. Knetsch and Sinden, 1984).  
 
In this paper we shall use none of these approaches (i.e. WTP and WTA). In fact, we will 
attempt to estimate subjects’ preference functions using two alternative elicitation 
mechanisms. Specifically, we shall confront subject preferences elicited in a choice context 
(i.e. pairwise choice mechanism) and subject preferences elicited in a price context (i.e. 
certainty equivalent, CE). In the former case, the subject faces a choice between two goods 
(two lotteries or two different quantities of a good, organic versus non-organic bananas in our 
case); after having expressed his/her preference, the subject receives the good opted for.15 In 
the latter case subjects are asked to indicate the certainty equivalent that they attribute to a 
lottery (in the case of an organic product this figure will coincide with the reservation price). 
 
                                                 
14 In the environmental economics literature, this notion is usually understood as the willingness to accept 
compensation for the loss of an environmental amenity or service.  
15 This factor should serve as a guarantee that subjects express their true preference.   7
The latter case requires the implementation of the so-called BDM mechanism16 (Becker, 
DeGroot and Marschak, 1964). This specific incentive scheme was originally developed to 
construct a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function by determining a series of certainty 
equivalent of binary lotteries. Here subjects are asked to state an amount of money such that 
they do not care whether they will receive this amount or the good. Then, a number z is 
randomly drawn between 1 and y, where y is higher than the value of the good in question. 
If z is greater or equal to the amount stated by the subject, he/she receives y, otherwise 
he/she receives y - z and the good itself.  
 
In our experiment we chose to adapt a typical CV survey to include both choice-context and 
CE-context components, inserting it in a general incentive-compatible framework. This shall 
allow us to investigate if our experimental sample behaves accordingly to the ‘too poor to be 
green’ hypothesis or not (H2). However, before stepping into the ‘environmental evaluation’ 
part of our analysis we shall address the first research hypothesis, namely whether estimating 
Ghanaians preferences using a lottery incentive scheme produces results unaffected by 
cultural biases (H1).17  
 
3.2 Preference Elicitation: Some notes on estimation techniques  
As just discussed we estimate Ghanaians’ preferences using both certainty equivalent method 
and pairwise choice data. We shall now briefly explain how such estimations are actually 
made.  
 
The estimation of the parameters of the utility function from pairwise choice data follows 
Hey and Orme (1994). Let’ indicate the two lotteries in the pairwise choice by L and R; then, 
assuming that there is no noise or error in the subject’s responses, she/he will report a 
preference for L(R), if and only if Eu(L) > (<) Eu(R) - that is, if and only if E[u(L) - u(R)] > (<) 
0. However, as we know from the existing literature, subjects’ responses are typically affected 
by noise. If we denote this noise or measurement error by ε, then the subject will report a 
preference for L(R), if and only if E[(L) - u(R)] + ε  > (<) 0, that is, if and only if ε  > (<) E[(R) - 
                                                 
16 There are two orders of reasons which support our decision to use BDM: first and foremost, Hey, Morone and 
S c h m i d t  ( 2 0 0 7 )  s h o w e d  i n  a  r e c e n t  p a p e r  h o w  ( u n d e r  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  s u b j e c t s  h a v e  E x p e c t e d  U t i l i t y  
functions) “BDM performs better then ASK [WTA], which, in turn, performs better than BID [WTP]” (2007: 
13); secondly, given the fact that at the University of Ghana there was no computer laboratory available to 
conduct the experiments, BDM turned to be more suitable for paper and pencil experiments. 
17 In our experiment we presume that all individuals behave according to Expected Utility theory. Note that, 
however strong, this assumption is supported by a wide empirical and theoretical literature. Using solely choice 
data, Harless and Camerer (1994), Camerer and Ho (1994), Hey and Orme (1994), Hey (1995), and Harrison 
(1994) found that expected utility is, at least from a statistical point of view, not dominated by its more general 
alternatives. Using both price and choice data, a similar finding was obtained by Schmidt and Hey (2004), and 
by Morone and Schmidt (2003).   8
u(L)]. Following this line of reasoning we can now write the probability that the subject 
reports a preference for L (R) as: Prob{ε  > (<) E[(R) - u(L)]}.  
 
Given the actually reported preferences, we will proceed to the estimation of the parameter r 
(the relative risk aversion coefficient) using maximum likelihood methods. To do so we need 
to specify the distribution of the measurement error which we shall assume to be normally 
distributed with mean 0 and variance s2. As noted by Hey and Orme (1994), the magnitude of 
s measures the noisiness of the subject’s responses: if s = 0 then the subject makes no mistakes 
- as s increases, the noise gets larger and larger. In the limit, when s is infinite, there is no 
information content in the subject’s responses.  
 
For the certainty equivalent methods, we follow the same route. If the subject is asked to 
provide his/her certainty equivalent for some gamble G, we will assume that the subject 
calculates the Expected Utility of the gamble, according to his/her utility function, and then 
calculates V - that is, certain amount of money that yields the same utility. We can now write 
u(V) = EU(G). However, if we acknowledge the existence of error and model it as above, then 
we have u(V) = EU(G) + ε,  and can hence note that the probability density of V being 
reported as the certainty equivalent of the gamble, is given by f{u-1[EU(G) +  ε]}, where f(.) is 
the probability density function of ε. If we now make the same assumption about the 
distribution of the measurement error ε - namely that it is N(0,s2) - we can proceed to the 
estimation of the r and s parameters by maximum likelihood. 
 
Note that when estimating an utility function from an experiment, there are two usual 
approaches: (a) to assume a particular functional form and estimate the parameters of that 
form; or (b) to estimate the utility at the various outcome values used in the experiment. In 
the experiment which we conducted, there were four outcome values ($0, $1, $3 and $4) 
which we denote by x1, x2, x3 and x4. If we adopt the usual normalisation, we put u1 = 0 and u4 
= 1, where we denote u(xi) by ui. This means that, following approach (b), we simply estimate 
u2 and u3.  
 
However, when we are using certainty equivalent estimation we need to know the value of 
the utility at outcome values other than x1, x2, x3 and x4. This requires assuming a particular 
functional form for subjects utility - i.e. following approach (a). To make this equivalent to 
the estimation following approach (b) we need to choose an appropriate functional form. We 
assumed that subjects have a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function. 
Further, to over impose the normalisation used above - that is, u1 = 0 and u4 = 1 - we need to 
adopt the following specific form: 
 
u(x) = (x/4) r 
   9
We then need to estimate only the parameter r as it fully describes the utility function of 
each individual. However, we assume that the standard deviation of the noise - that is, the 
magnitude of s - is different for the different elicitation methods (i.e. choice and price), and 
we estimate them individually. So we estimate the noise for each of the elicitation methods. 
Once having calculated r and its noise standard deviation (s), we will attempt to see if there is 
any bias in the elicitation methods. Following again Hey and Orme (1994) we model any 
potential bias in the CE elicitation method assuming that there is a true valuation V and a 
reported valuation v, which are related by: 
 
v = a + bV 
 
Here the parameters a and b determine the bias in the reporting of the certainty equivalents. 
If a = 0 and b = 1 there is no bias. We assume no bias in the pairwise choice elicitation 
method as it is hard to believe that subjects, when expressing their preferences in a pairwise 
choice gamble (i.e. where they have to chose between the left-hand side or the right-hand 
side lottery), err systematically in favour of one or the other (i.e. the one on the right or the 
one on the left). Note that we are not assuming by any means that in such context there is no 
error; however, we can confidently state that subjects will hardly be affected by systematic 
errors (hence, error preserves the characteristics of white noise). In this regard, some further 
explanation is perhaps needed. With the certainty equivalent methods, particularly with the 
willingness to pay and the willingness to accept questions, there are well known biases: when 
asked how much they are willing to pay, it is widely agreed that subjects underbid; and they 
are asked how much they are willing to accept, they over-ask.18  This is partly because 
subjects do not appear to fully understand the question and perceive of it as some kind of 
strategic game. In contrast, a pairwise choice question is not open to such a misinterpretation, 
particularly in the context of the usual incentive mechanism; in other words, if the subject 
knows that her/his stated choice on any pairwise choice question is to be played out (and he 
or she is paid accordingly), what (conscious or unconscious) reason is there for not replying 
according to his/her true preferences? 
 
4. The Experiment 
As mentioned, our experiment was conducted at the University of Ghana at Legon (Accra) in 
October 2005. 38 subjects participated in the experiment:19 19 undergraduate and 
postgraduate Geology students and 19 undergraduate students of Agricultural Economics.20 
As aforementioned, we do not believe that these students are wholly representative of 
                                                 
18 See, among others, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991); Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988). 
19 Note that we originally recruited 20 students for each treatment; however, in each treatment one student did 
not show up. 
20 An additional session was run in October 2006 where we interviewed 20 students following a standard CV 
approach. See Contingent Valuation Session in the Annex.   10
Ghanaian society; we are very much aware of the fact that higher education in Ghana is 
costly and that students are thus generally from families which are, at least to a limited 
extent, better-off. Even so, we believe that University students are most likely to produce, in 
the future, the new leadership class of the country; a leadership able to influence the ideas 
and patterns of behaviours of local communities, either through a direct participation in 
policymaking processes - for instance, as politicians - or through a grassroot type of activism - 
for instance, as tribal chiefs or as NGO activists. Having this in mind, we shall maintain that 
the Ghanaian students who participated in the experiments, while not representative of the 
entire population, are most likely to turn into important agents of change in their society. As 
such, their valuation of the environment appears to be particularly interesting and pertinent 
to the question of policymaking. 
 
The experiment’s administration was facilitated through the use of a booklet, handed out to 
each subject and divided into four parts; in the first part, subjects were asked to provide some 
socio-demographic information (age, age of father, as well as some indicators to help inferring 
the socio-economic status of the family) and information about their environmental 
awareness and knowledge.21 In the second part of the booklet, subjects were provided with a 
briefing note containing some explanations on the costs and benefits associated with the 
production of organic bananas (see Annex). The last two parts consisted in the actual 
experimental design, which was divided into two sessions: in the first session we elicited 
preference towards risk (through the use of lotteries) and in the second session we elicited 
preference towards green products (to be referred to from now on as organic). Every group of 
students participated in one treatment: in the first we investigated price behaviour while in 
the second choice behaviour.  
 
Overall, we conducted two sessions for each treatment (as summarised in table 1) that lasted 
about 1 hour each. As already mentioned, 19 subjects participated in the price treatment, and 
19 subjects participate in the choice one. Subjects were admitted to only one treatment of the 
experiment to avoid anchor effects.  
                                                 
21 For instance, previous knowledge about risks associated with pesticides, importance attributed to 
environmental issues in Ghana, involvement in environmental grassroots or non-governmental organisation, 
etc. The results of this questionnaire shall not be discussed here. For the purposes of this study, it is sufficient 
saying that respondents, mostly, considered themselves very much aware of the risks associated with pesticide 
residues in fresh produce. For the complete questionnaire and its results, see the Annex.    11
 
  Treatment 1  Treatment 2 
Session 1  Price-Lottery Choice-Lottery 
Session 2  Price-Organic   Choice-Organic 
Table 1: The structure of the experiment  
 
At the end of each treatment we randomly selected one subject who actually played the lottery 
with an endowment equal to about US$ 4.5 (40,000 cedi) in the case of price-lottery, and equal 
to US$ 2.25 (20,000 cedi) in the case of price-organic. All other subjects received approximately 
US$ 3.3 as participation fee (30,000 cedi). The whole procedure was carefully explained to all 
participants before starting the experiments.  
 
In the Price-Lottery session subjects were presented with 56 lotteries. A detailed list of all 
probabilities for each lottery is reported in the Annex. All lotteries were composed by as high as 
three of the four consequences $0, $1, $3 and $4. For each gamble subjects were asked to state 
their CE. In the Choice-Lottery session, on the other hand, subjects were presented with 28 
pairwise choice lotteries. The complete probabilities list of each pair of lotteries is reported in 
the Annex.  
 
In the Price-Organic session subjects were asked to state the price they were willing to pay to 
buy q organic bananas, where q ∈ [1, 20] ⊂ N. In the Choice-Organic session subjects were 
asked to choose between q organic bananas and (q + i) non-organic bananas, where q ∈ [1, 10] ⊂ 
N , and  i ∈ [1, 10] ⊂ N . Subjects were requested to state their choices. 
 
In all sessions we used incentive compatible elicitation mechanisms: CE was elicited with the 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism, where each subject had to state his/her CE for the 
lottery/organic good. Once subjects have handed in their booklets, the experimenter 
randomly picked one of the 56 lotteries and a randomly selected subject got the right to play 
it out. Indifference was not allowed. In the case of pairwise choice, the experimenter 
randomly picked one of the 28 pairs of lotteries and a randomly selected subject got the right 
to play it out. Also in this case indifference was not allowed. A similar procedure was 
followed in the price-organic and in the choice-organic sessions. 
 
5. Results 
We will now report the main results obtained in the experiment. We shall first consider the 
results obtained in the two lottery sessions. As already mentioned, this part of the experiment 
is meant to allow us to investigate individuals’ preference functions. Subsequently we will 
present the results obtained in the organic sessions which is meant to allow us to study 
Ghanaians’ preferences for green products and more specifically for organic bananas.  
   12
5.1 Lotteries sessions’ results 
We estimate individual preferences functions subject by subject as players clearly differ in 
terms of their preferences. In order to estimate individual preferences we shall calculate the 
utility function u(x) as defined in section 3. As already mentioned, all we need to calculate to 
define the individual preference function is the parameter r (i.e. the relative risk aversion 
coefficient) as it gives a complete account of the utility function of the individual. 
Subsequently we will estimate the log-likelihood values of our estimates which provide a first 
measurement of their goodness of fit. Recalling the discussion conducted earlier we shall then 
attempt to measure the error and the bias attached to our estimates. Specifically, we will 
measure the estimated standard deviation of the measurement error (s) and the parameters a 
and b which determine the bias in the reporting of the certainty equivalents intercept. 
 
 
Relative risk 
aversion 
coefficient
Goodness of fit 
Standard deviation 
of the measurement 
error 
Subjects r Log-likelihood a b s
1 0.742 -2.030 3.252 -0.047 0.668
2 0.122 -1.205 0.702 1.284 0.442
3 0.722 -2.027 3.267 -0.139 0.667
4 0.529 -1.856 2.524 0.426 0.612
5 0.469 -1.996 2.665 0.173 0.657
6 0.379 -1.456 1.883 0.601 0.501
7 0.021 -1.907 -0.331 1.440 0.628
8 0.230 -1.150 1.383 0.552 0.430
9 0.263 -1.493 0.959 1.203 0.511
10 0.223 -1.778 1.525 0.578 0.589
11 0.163 -1.260 0.795 1.327 0.454
12 0.104 -1.046 0.624 0.816 0.408
13 0.331 -1.572 1.965 0.576 0.531
14 0.685 -1.552 1.921 0.608 0.526
15 0.429 -1.953 2.544 0.276 0.642
16 0.498 -1.749 1.982 0.389 0.580
17 0.725 -2.017 3.294 -0.164 0.663
18 0.246 -1.935 2.118 0.254 0.637
19 0.504 -1.931 2.584 0.256 0.635
Bias                 
Intercept        Slope 
Table 2: Estimations of CRRA Model with BDM data (price-lottery) 
 
 
In table 2 we present the estimations obtained using BDM responses. Looking at these results 
we can draw some preliminary conclusions: first, the relative risk aversion coefficient is 
always smaller than 1 and is, on average, equal to 0.38. As we know from our utility function, 
r equals 1 when the subject is risk neutral, smaller than 1 if she/he is risk averse and bigger   13
than 1 if the subject is risk lover. Hence, we can conclude that our subjects are, on average, 
risk averse. These findings are quite satisfactory as they are pretty much comparable to 
previous results obtained by the vast literature which refers to developed countries. All in all, 
this is a preliminary confirmation of our first hypothesis (H1), according to which when 
estimating Ghanaians preferences using a lottery incentive schemes, such estimates would 
produce results unbiased by the specific cultural setting and religious beliefs of the 
participant. 
 
We shall now turn to consider the goodness of fit of our estimations, the error standard 
deviation and the estimation bias. In the third column of table 2 we report the log-likelihood 
values of our estimates which, as already mentioned, are a first measurement of the goodness 
of fit. The value is, on average, around -1.6 and varies moderately across estimations. The 
forth and the fifth columns of table 2 report the bias estimate and specifically the a and b 
coefficients. As noted earlier, an unbiased estimation would have produced a value of a equal 
to 0 and a value of b equal to 1. As this is clearly not the case here, we can conclude that 
there is a bias in our estimations. Finally, in the last column of table 2 we report a measure of 
the error standard deviation. At this stage, knowing that the standard deviation varies across 
0 and +∞, we can maintain that these estimates display a relatively small error standard 
deviation. 
 
We shall now move on to estimate individual preferences using the choice data. In table 3 we 
present the estimations obtained using pairwise-choice responses. As already discussed, it is 
natural to assume that this elicitation method produces unbiased estimates. Hence, we report 
here solely the estimated risk attitude (r), the log-likelihood values as a measure of the 
goodness of fit and the estimated standard deviation of the measurement error (s). 
 
As we can immediately notice, again subjects display, on average, a moderate risk aversion. 
However, in this case, risk aversion is slightly more pronounced as it reaches an average value 
of 0.29. This result corroborates our earlier finding that estimating Ghanaians’ preferences 
using a lottery incentive scheme would produce results unbiased by the specific cultural 
setting and religious beliefs of the participants. The goodness of fit of these second estimates 
(choice-lottery) is generally higher than that obtained in the price-lottery case. As we can 
derive from Hey and Orme (1994), the higher the log-likelihood value is - the better is the 
model. Hence, we can conclude that the choice model produces a better fit. The reason 
behind such finding is probably that a choice problem is an easier task to solve.22 Finally, 
when looking at standard deviation of the measurement error we can corroborate our earlier 
finding that choice data provides more accurate results. In fact, the choice data standard error 
is generally smaller than the price data one. 
                                                 
22 Note that this finding is in line with existing literature. See, among others, Morone and Schmidt (2003) and 
Hey, Morone and Schmidt (2007).   14
 
Relative risk 
aversion 
coefficient
Goodness of fit 
Standard deviation 
of the measurement 
error 
Subjects r Log-likelihood s
1 0.247 -0.210 0.115
2 0.234 -0.166 0.163
3 0.472 0.000 0.003
4 0.514 0.000 0.000
5 0.284 -0.117 0.096
6 0.273 -0.192 0.092
7 0.232 -0.098 0.107
8 0.314 -0.210 0.126
9 0.236 0.000 0.001
10 0.218 0.000 0.000
11 0.274 -0.268 0.094
12 0.348 -0.080 0.127
13 0.317 -0.233 0.165
14 0.291 -0.249 0.137
15 0.312 -0.202 0.103
16 0.249 -0.113 0.035
17 0.272 -0.137 0.078
18 0.265 -0.061 0.045
19 0.144 -0.140 0.138
 
Table 3: Estimations of CRRA Model with pairwise-choice data (choice-lottery) 
 
We can conclude that this investigation, in the case of Ghana, is in line with results 
previously obtained in the literature. Specifically, we can maintain that Ghanaians are 
generally risk averse and that using choice problem to elicit individual preferences (although 
providing less information if compared to price lotteries) produces better results, i.e. smaller 
error and better fit.  
 
5.2 Organic sessions’ results 
In the environmental preferences evaluation part of our experiment we attempted to elicit 
the real extra premium that subjects, as consumers, are willing to pay for green products 
(organic bananas).23 In figures 1 and 2 we report subjects’ willingness to pay for a growing 
number of respectively organic and non-organic bananas. Consequently the slopes of these 
curves (λ) represent the reservation prices attributed by players to both organic and non-
                                                 
23 As already discussed, we use an incentive-based mechanism in order to elicit the real willingness to pay for 
organic bananas. In the Annex we compare these findings with those obtained through the CV interviews (i.e. 
where subjects were not faced with a real payment scenario). We also provide socio-demographic as well as 
environmental awareness information gathered through a questionnaire identical to the one used for the 
incentive-based experiment.   15
organic bananas. As we can see, the slope of these curves is almost constant as the curves tend 
to be linear in fashion. This suggests that under the assumption of linearity, marginal price 
(i.e. the reservation price for each additional unit of the good considered) and average price 
coincide. Moreover, this implies that the marginal price expressed by subjects is independent 
from the quantity acquired, suggesting that players do not show the occurrence of income or 
substitution effects. Note that this finding should not come as a surprise given the relatively 
small number of bananas offered in our experiment. 
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Figure 1: Subjects’ willingness to pay for organic      
products (price-organic) 
Figure 2: Subjects’ willingness to pay for non-organic 
products (price-organic) 
 
 
 
Further to this, it is relevant to show how our result counters the Diamond et al. (1993) 
critique according to which WTP analysis does not pass the adding-up test due to the 
embedding effect - i.e. that willingness-to-pay is the same whether one or several items are 
valued. We are not, by any means, maintaining that our result contradicts the overall 
significance of Diamond et al.’s argument; however, we hold that it does not apply to the 
specific environmental good considered in this experiment. 
 
We shall now estimate the slope of each curve, under the assumption of linearity, and 
compare them across subjects.24 Note that the price ratio  ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−organic non
organic
λ
λ
 calculated subject by 
subject represents the substitution rate of the two goods.  Therefore, this rate can give us a 
measure of the ‘organic premium’ i.e. the appreciation of the environment as it is expressed 
directly by the Ghanaians who participated to the experiment. In other words, by looking at 
these ratios we are able to address our second research hypothesis (H2); more specifically we 
are able to verify whether Ghanaians display a preference for green products when compared 
                                                 
24 We do this by means of OLS estimates.   16
to non-organic ones. Note that a substitution rate higher than 1 implies a preference for 
green products (and a consequently higher willingness to pay), whereas a value smaller than 
1 implies a preference for non-organic goods. Of course, if the ratio is equal to unity it implies 
that the two goods are perceived as perfect substitutes in a ratio of 1 to 1.  
 
Subjects λorganic λnon-organic substitution rate
1 700.800 499.930 1.402
2 532.400 500.000 1.065
3 467.420 367.420 1.272
4 433.830 500.000 0.868
5 411.500 593.620 0.693
6 349.790 500.000 0.700
7 697.040 400.000 1.743
8 806.450 485.440 1.661
9 463.420 200.000 2.317
10 465.160 511.150 0.910
11 482.970 460.310 1.049
12 647.080 400.000 1.618
13 726.100 612.400 1.186
14 440.980 363.900 1.212
15 839.870 678.710 1.237
16 793.210 477.530 1.661
17 465.160 500.000 0.930
18 332.340 429.090 0.775
19 928.230 643.620 1.442
 
Table 4: Organic-non organic substitution rate (choice-organic) 
 
The data displayed in table 4 shows that in 13 out of 19 cases subjects exhibit a preference for 
organic goods. This finding suggests that almost 68.5 percent of the players that took part at 
the experiment have a clear preference for protecting the environment. This awareness to 
environmental issues results in the willingness to pay, on average, 20 percent more for green 
products. If we consider the premium only for those subjects who have stated a preference 
for green products, than the figure goes up to around 35 percent. We note that this finding, 
obtained through an incentive-compatible experiment in a laboratory environment, confirms 
previous results obtained using a WTP survey approach. The already cited study of Al-Hassan 
and Jatoe (2005) found that consumers interviewed in the capital Accra were willing to pay 
20 percent more for a germ-free cabbage and almost 30 percent more for a pesticide-free one. 
It should be stressed, however, that while the aforementioned study was focused on the 
health implications of pesticide use, our study investigated attitudes towards 
environmentally-sound practices, where human health implications are only but one 
element.  
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We shall now compare the results obtained through the price-organic experiment with those 
obtained through the choice-organic one. Looking at the choice data (figure 3), we have a 
very clear picture: 36.84 percent of the subjects always chose the organic product, while 
26.32 percent always preferred the non-organic product. Slightly more than one fifth of all 
subjects (21.05 percent) first expressed their preference for the organic product and 
subsequently, once the number of non-organic bananas was sufficiently high (i.e. when the i 
value was sufficiently high), switched to the non-organic product. Three subjects seem to be 
inconsistent since they do not respect transitivity (e.g. after having first stated their 
preference for 2 non-organic bananas over 1 organic banana, they switched their preferences 
to 1 organic banana over 3 non-organic bananas). 
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        Figure 3: Subjects’ categorisation in the choice data experiment (choice-organic) 
 
Overall, the choice-organic results confirm our findings for the price-organic sessions: almost 
58 percent of the experimental subjects25 displayed a preference for organic products, out of 
which 36.84 percent showed a persistent preference for organic products (i.e. regardless of 
the number of extra non-organic bananas offered during the experiment).26  
                                                 
25 This percentage goes up to 68.74 if we exclude those three agents who showed an inconsistent behaviour. 
Interestingly enough, this percentage is exactly the same as the one obtained with price data. 
26 Note that typically, Ghanaians prefer the small non-organic bananas that, they claim, are sweeter. This 
preference is also explainable by the fact that the bigger, organic bananas are normally exported, so as to satisfy 
preferences of developed countries consumers and not local. Assuming that also the participants in the 
experiment tend to prefer the non-organic bananas for their sweetness, we can conclude that our results - where 
a clear preference towards organic bananas has been observed - are even more significant.   18
All in all, we can conclude that also by looking at choice data we get a confirmation to our 
second hypothesis. Moreover, as noted earlier, only few subjects provided inconsistent 
answers (3 out of 38 if we consider both experimental sessions). This suggests that students 
involved in the experiment have clearly understood the type of experiment they took part in 
and that the incentive scheme was appropriate. This fact suggests that the standard 
preferences elicitation techniques in an incentive-compatible experiment turned out to be an 
adequate tool to elicit Ghanaians preferences towards the environment.  
 
Subjects
Threshold of 
substitution 
1c o n f u s e d
2a > 1 1
3 3<a<4
4a > 1 1
5a > 1 1
6a = 2
7c o n f u s e d
8a > 1 1
9 4<a<5
10 a<2
11 a<2
12 a<2
13 a<2
14 a>11
15 a>11
16 6<a<7
17 confused
18 a<2
19 a>11  
Table 5: Organic-non organic substitution thresholds (choice-organic) 
 
As discussed earlier, choice experiments, though simpler to understand, provide less 
information if compared to price experiments. In fact, with choice data we cannot calculate 
the exact substitution rate of the two goods. We can, however, calculate the threshold value 
above which agents are willing to opt for one good or the other. In table 5 we report these 
threshold values calculated for each subject.27 First, we observe that such threshold is not 
calculable for those players who were earlier classified as inconsistent as they move back and 
forth from such threshold. Second, we can see that for seven subjects all we can say is that 
the substitution threshold lies somewhere above the ratio one to eleven; in fact, we are 
                                                 
27 Note that comparing the substitution rate reported in table 4 and the substitution thresholds reported in table 
5, we can observe significant differences. This is, of course, due to the different elicitation methods used in the 
two sessions.   19
unable to identify this threshold in our experiment (if existing), where the highest 
substitution rate proposed to players was as high as one to eleven. Third, four players are 
either indifferent (with a ratio of one) between the two goods or prefer non-organic bananas. 
Forth, for three agents we can define an interval of substitution included among two adjacent 
integers. Finally, for one player we can pinpoint the exact substitution rate, under the 
assumption that random answers within the same i-group of questions imply indifference.28 
 
6. Conclusions  
The aim of this study was to investigate Ghanaians preferences towards the environment; we 
did so by means of a laboratory experiment conducted at the University of Legon in Accra. 
Specifically, we set the objective of addressing the following two research hypotheses:  
H1: It is possible to estimate Ghanaians preferences using a lottery incentive scheme and such 
estimates would produce results unaffected by cultural bias 
H2: Ghanaians display a preference for green products (organic bananas) when compared to 
non-green products  
 
Our experimental results suggest that both hypotheses have proved to be true in the case of 
Ghana. Bearing in mind that our experiment has been conducted among University students, 
whose economic conditions are likely to be above the average Ghanaian, we believe this 
result is a first step towards a much needed direct elicitation of local preferences towards the 
environment in LDCs. This idea counters what Brechin and Kempton have dubbed ‘the 
conventional wisdom’, according to which “citizens of developing countries do not or cannot 
care about the environment” (1994: 247) or that they are ‘too poor to be green’.  
 
In terms of implications of our study, we feel that our results should stimulate further 
research, aiming, eventually, at suggesting an environmental policy based on the direct 
involvement of local stakeholders in the definition of local policies.  
 
 
REFERENCES 
Al-Hassan, R. and Jatoe, J.B., 2005. Consumer Willingness to Pay for Pesticide-Free and Germ-Free 
Fresh Vegetables: Perception versus Reality in Accra. Mimeo. University of Ghana in legon. 
Alm, J. and Torgler, B. 2006. “Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the United States and in 
Europe”, Journal of Economic Psychology 7:2, pp. 224-246. 
Anyemedu, K. 2000. Trade Union Responses to Globalization: Case Study on Ghana. ILO Discussion 
Paper no. DP/121/2000. Labour and Society Programme, ILO. 
                                                 
28 Recall that in the choice-organic session subjects were asked to choose between q organic bananas and (q + i) 
non-organic bananas, where q ∈ [1, 10] ⊂ N , and  i ∈ [1, 10] ⊂ N .   20
Ara, S. 2003. “Consumer Willingness to Pay for Multiple Attributes of Organic Rice: A Case Study in 
the Philippines”. Paper presented at the 25th International Conference of Agricultural 
Economists, August 16-22, Durban, South Africa. 
Becker G., DeGroot, M. and J. Marschak, 1964. “Measuring Utility by a Single Response Sequential 
Method”, Behavioral Science 9, pp. 226-232. 
Boccaletti, S., and Nardella, M. 2000 Consumer willingness to pay for pesticide-free fresh fruit and 
vegetables in Italy, International Food and Agribusiness Management Review 3, pp. 297-310. 
Bowles, S. 1998. “Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other 
Economic Institutions”, Journal of Economic Literature 36:1, pp. 75-111.  
Brechin, S.R. and Kempton, W. 1994. “Global Environmentalism: A Challenge to the Post Materialist 
Thesis?” Social Science Quarterly, 75:2, pp. 245-269. 
Burlando, R. and Hey, J.D. 1997. “Do Anglo-Saxsons Free-ride More?” Journal of Public Economics 
64, pp. 41-60. 
Camerer, C.F. and Ho, T.H. 1994. “Violations of the Betweeness Axiom and Non-Linearity in 
Probabilty”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 8:2, pp. 167-196.  
Carson R., Wright, J.L., Carson, N.J., Alberini, A. and N.E. Flores, 1995. A Bibliography of Contingent 
Valuation Studies and Papers. San Diego: Natural Resources Damages Assessment Inc. 
Carson, R. Flores, N. and N. Meade. 2001. “Contingent Valuation, Controversies and Evidence”, 
Environmental and Resource Economics 19:2, pp.  173-219. 
Cranfield, J. and Magnusson, E. 2003. “Canadian Consumer’s Willingness-To-Pay for Pesticide Free 
Food Products: An Ordered Probit Analysist”, International Food and Agribusiness 
Management Review 6:4, pp. 13-30.  
Cropper, M., M. Haile, J. Lampietti, C. Poulos and D. Whittington, 1999. The Value of Preventing 
Malaria in Tembien, Ethiopia. World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 2273. December.  
Danso, G., Drechsel, P. and S. Pialor, 2002. “Perceptions of organic agriculture by urban vegetable 
farmers and consumers in Ghana”, Urban Agriculture Magazine 6, pp. 23-24.  
Dasgupta, S., Laplante, B., Wang, H., and D. Wheeler, 2002. “Confronting the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 16:1, pp. 147-168.  
 
Diamond, P.A. and Hausman, J.A. 1994. “Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No 
Number?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 8:4, pp. 45-64.  
Diamond, P.A., Hausman, J.A., Leonard, G.K. and M.A. Denning, 1993. “Does Contingent Valuation 
Measure Preferences? Experimental Evidence”, pp. 41-62 in Hausman, J. (Ed.), Contingent 
Valuation: A Critical Assessment. Amsterdam, Elsevier Science Publishers. 
Gil, J.M., Gracia, A. and M. Sanchez, 2000. “Market Segmentation and Willingness to Pay for Organic 
Products in Spain”, International Food and Agribusiness Management Review 3, pp. 207-226. 
Harless, D.W. and Camerer, C.F. 1994. “The Predictive Utility of Generalized Expected Utility 
Theories”, Econometrica 62:6, pp. 1251-1289. 
Harrison, G.W. 1994. “Expected Utility Theory and the Experimentalists”, Empirical Economics 19:2, 
pp. 223-253. 
Henrich, J., 2000, “Does Culture Matter in Economic Behavior? Ultimatum Game Bargaining among 
the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon”, American Economic Review 90:4, pp. 973-979. 
Hey, J.D. 1995. “Experimental Investigations of Errors in Decision Making under Risk”, European 
Economic Review 39:3, pp. 633-640.   21
Hey, J.D. and Orme, C. 1994. “Investigating Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory Using 
Experimental Data”, Econometrica 62:6, pp. 1291-1326. 
Hey, J.D., Morone, A. and U. Schmidt. 2007. “Noise and Bias in Eliciting Preferences”, Discussion 
Papers in Economics 2007/04, University of York. 
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J.L., and R.H. Thaler, 1991. “Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss 
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives 5:1, pp. 193-206. 
Kachelmeier, S.J. and Shehata, M. 1992. “Examining Risk Preferences under High Monetary 
Incentives: Experimental Evidence from the People’s Republic of China”, American Economic 
Review 82:5, pp. 1120-1141. 
Kinnear, T.C. and Taylor, R.J. 1973. “The Effect of Ecological Concern on Brand Perceptions”, Journal 
of Marketing Research 10, pp. 191-197. 
Knetsch, J.L. and Sinden, J.A. 1984. “Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental 
Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
99:3, pp. 507-521. 
Levitt, S. D., List J. A., (2007), “What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences 
Reveal About the Real World?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives,  Vol. 21,    Issue  2 
pp. 153-174 
Martin, B. and Simintiras, A.C. 1995. “The Impact of Green Product Lines on the Environment: Does 
what They Know Affect How They Feel?”, Marketing Intelligence and Planning 13, pp. 16-23. 
Martinez-Alier, J. 1995. “The Environment as a Luxury Good or ‘Too Poor to be Green’”. Ecological 
Economics, 13, pp. 1-10. 
Martinez-Alier, J. and Guah, R. 1997. Varieties of Environmentalism: Essays North and South. 
London: Earthscan.  
Morone, A. and Schmidt, U. 2003. An Experimental Investigation of Alternatives to Expected Utility 
Using Pricing Data, University of Hannover Discussion Paper No 28. 
Nye, J.S. 1990. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books.  
Oosterbeek, H., Sloof, R., and G. van de Kuilen, 2004. “Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game 
Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis”, Experimental Economics 7:2, pp. 171-188. 
Ottaviano, G. and Peri, G. 2006. “The Economic Value of Cultural Diversity: Evidence from US 
Cities”, Journal of Economic Geography 6:1, pp. 9-44. 
Ozanne, L.K. and Vlosky.R.P. 2003. “Certification from the US Consumer Perspective: A Comparison 
of 1995 and 2000”. Forest Products Journal 53:3, pp. 13-21. 
Panayotou, T. 1993. “Empirical Tests and Policy Analysis of Environmental Degradation at different 
Stages of Economic Development”, Working Paper WP238, Technology and Employment 
Programme, ILO, Geneva.  
Pattanayak, S., Whittington, D. Yang J. and Kumar B. 2002. Willingness to Pay for Improved Water 
Supply in Kathmandu Valley, Nepal. Research Triangle Institute. Final Report to the Water and 
Sanitation Program for South Asia, New Delhi: World Bank;  
Pearce, D.W. and Turner, K.R. 1990. Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Prothero, A. and McDonagh, P. 1993. “The European Community and Environmentalism: The Impact 
of EC Environmental Policies upon the Marketing Function” pp. 985-1004 in Baker, M.J. (Ed.) 
Perspectives on Marketing Management Vol. 3. Chichester: Wiley.   22
Roth, A.E., Prasnikar, V., Okuno-Fujiware, M., and S. Zamir, 1991. “Bargaining and Market Behavior 
in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittaburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study”, American Economic 
Review 81:5, pp. 1068-1095. 
Samuelson L., (2005), “Economic Theory and Experimental Economics”, Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol 43,  Issue 1, pp. 65-107 
Samuelson, W. and R. Zeckhauser, 1988. “Status quo bias in decision making”, Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty 1:1, pp. 7-59. 
Schmidt, U. and Hey, J.D. 2004. “Are Preference Reversals Errors? An Experimental Investigation”, 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 29:3, pp. 207-218. 
Scialabba, N. 2000. “Factors Influencing Organic Agriculture Policies with a Focus on Developing 
Countries”, IFOAM 2000 Scientific Conference, Basel, Switzerland, 28-31 August. Available on-
line at: www.fao.org/organicag/doc/BaselSum-final.doc. Accessed on: 01.09.2006. 
Siaw, G.K., 2003. “Fair Trade Bananas: Contributing to Sustainable Rural  Livelihoods in Ghana”. 
World Trade Organization Public Symposium: Challenges Ahead on the Road to Cancun, 
Geneva, June 16-18.  
Thurow, L. 1980. The Zero-Sum Society: Distribution and the Possibilities for Change. New York: 
Basic Books.  
VREL (Volta River Estates Limited). Banana Production. Available online at: 
http://www.voltariver.com/.  
WEFA (Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates), 2001. Ghana Country Monitor. March.   
Whittington, D. 2002. “Improving the Performance of Contingent Valuation Studies in Developing 
Countries”, Environmental and Resource Economics 22, pp. 323–367. 
Willer, H. & Yussefi, M. (Eds.), 2004. The World of Organic Agriculture: Statistics and Emerging 
Trends, 2004. Bonn: International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements.   
Wolf, M. 2004. Why Globalisation Works? The Case for Global Market Economy. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
   23
Annex 
 
I. Socio-demographic and environmental awareness questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions, by circling the answer that most suits you 
or by ticking the box. The information you will provide us with will remain 
anonymous and is only used to for statistical purposes. 
1. How would you define your concern 
for the environment?  
1 - very concerned 
2 - quite concerned 
3 - concerned, but only to a certain extent  
4 - not very concerned 
5 - it doesn’t concern me at all 
2. How important do you think 
environmental issues are? 
1 - Very important 
2 - Quite important  
3 - Important, but only to a certain extent  
4 - Not very important   
5 - Not important  
3. Are you a member of any associated 
involved in environmental protection? 
1- Yes* 
2- No 
* If yes, which one? ____________________ 
 
4. How important do you consider to be 
each of the following attributes of an 
ecological product? 
Please express the level of importance by 
writing into the boxes one of the 
following numbers: 
1 - Very important 
2 - Quite important  
3 - Important, but only to a certain 
extent  
4 - Not very important   
5 - Not important  
 Recyclable 
 Use of ecological production (for 
instance, lower energy consumption, waste 
disposal minimisation, organic methods) 
 Production using renewable resources 
 Production using toxic/dangerous 
materials   
 Other (please specify) _______________ 
 
5. How much do you know about 
Ghana’s environmental situation? 
1 - I am very updated as far as 
environmental issues in Ghana are 
concerned (through newspapers, leaflets of 
NGOs, reports of international 
organisations, local activism) 
2 - I follow, occasionally, reports/news 
about environmental issues in Ghana and   24
try to keep myself updated 
3 - I follow environmentally-related news 
in Ghana only if I accidentally come across 
them 
4 - I know very little about the 
environmental situation of Ghana (only big 
events that reach the TV news editions) 
5 - I know nothing about Ghana’s 
environment 
6. As far as you know, Ghana’s 
environmental situation is… 
1 - Very good 
2 - Quite good, considering its economic 
situation, and likely to improve  
3 - Deteriorating but with a positive outlook  
4 - Not so good 
5 - Deteriorating with no encouraging 
outlook  
7. How much are you aware to the 
dangers of pesticide residues in fruit and 
vegetable? 
1 - very aware 
2 - quite aware 
3 - aware, but only to a certain extent  
4 - not very aware 
5 - I don’t know anything about it 
Other questions*  
1. How old are you?   
2. How old is your father?   
3. Do you have a telephone?   Yes   No 
4. Do you a TV set?   Yes   No 
5. Do you have a computer?  
    Do you use the internet? 
 Yes   No 
 Yes   No 
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II. Questionnaires’ results 
 
                                       
Q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
1
Q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
2
Q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
3
Q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
4
 
Q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
5
Q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
6
Q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
7
A
g
e
F
a
t
h
e
r
'
s
 
a
g
e
T
e
l
e
p
h
o
n
T
V
P
C
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
S
u
b
j
e
c
t
H
o
w
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
y
o
u
 
d
e
f
i
n
e
 
y
o
u
r
 
c
o
n
c
e
r
n
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
v
.
?
H
o
w
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
 
d
o
 
y
o
u
 
t
h
i
n
k
 
e
n
v
.
 
i
s
s
u
e
s
 
a
r
e
?
A
r
e
 
y
o
u
 
a
 
m
e
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
a
n
 
a
s
s
o
c
 
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
d
 
i
n
 
e
n
v
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
?
H
o
w
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
 
d
o
 
y
o
u
 
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
 
 
e
a
c
h
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
a
t
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
s
 
o
f
 
a
n
 
e
c
o
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
?
Recyclable
Use of ecological 
production 
Prod. using 
renewable 
resources
Prod. using 
toxic/dangerous 
materials  
Other
H
o
w
 
m
u
c
h
 
d
o
 
y
o
u
 
k
n
o
w
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
G
h
a
n
a
’
s
 
e
n
v
.
 
s
i
t
u
a
t
i
o
n
?
A
s
 
f
a
r
 
a
s
 
y
o
u
 
k
n
o
w
,
 
G
h
a
n
a
’
s
 
e
n
v
.
 
s
i
t
u
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
…
H
o
w
 
m
u
c
h
 
R
 
U
 
a
w
a
r
e
 
t
o
 
d
a
n
g
e
r
s
 
o
f
 
p
e
s
t
i
c
i
d
e
 
r
e
s
i
d
u
e
s
 
i
n
 
f
r
e
s
h
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
?
1
3
1
2
2
1
1
4
3
2
2
2
1
5
6
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
3
3
1
2
1
5
1
1
1
0
0
3
1
1
2
1
2
4
1
2
1
5
7
1
1
1
1
4
2
1
2
1
2
2
5
4
2
1
2
5
9
5
1
1
1
1
5
1
1
1
 
-
 
F
o
E
1
2
3
4
1
4
1
2
5
6
3
1
1
1
1
6
1
1
2
2
4
1
5
1
3
1
2
8
5
5
1
1
0
1
7
1
1
1
 
-
 
W
i
l
d
 
L
i
f
e
1
2
1
5
2
3
3
2
1
5
1
1
0
1
1
8
1
1
2
2
5
3
0
0
1
9
2
2
2
1
1
2
5
1
5
1
2
2
4
3
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
2
1
1
1
5
4
2
1
2
3
6
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
3
1
2
3
5
0
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
1
2
1
1
1
4
4
3
1
2
2
4
7
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
2
2
1
1
3
4
2
1
2
2
1
0
0
1
1
4
2
1
2
1
1
1
5
U
s
e
 
o
r
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
r
e
 
b
i
o
d
e
g
r
a
d
a
b
l
e
2
3
2
2
2
6
7
1
1
1
1
1
5
1
1
1
 
-
 
G
r
e
e
n
 
E
a
r
t
h
1
2
4
1
2
3
1
1
0
1
1
6
3
2
2
2
2
1
2
L
a
b
o
u
r
 
c
o
s
t
2
4
3
2
3
5
0
0
0
0
1
1
7
1
1
2
1
1
1
5
3
2
3
2
1
5
8
0
1
0
1
1
8
1
1
2
1
2
1
5
3
5
3
2
2
6
3
0
0
0
1
1
9
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
2
5
6
8
1
0
0
1
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
1
.
5
8
1
.
1
1
1
.
2
7
1
.
5
0
1
.
2
7
4
.
1
4
2
.
4
2
3
.
2
1
1
.
6
3
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
o
c
i
o
-
d
e
m
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
a
w
a
r
e
n
e
s
s
 
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
n
a
i
r
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
a
l
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
s
 
s
t
u
d
e
n
t
s
 
s
e
s
s
i
o
n
)  26
                           
 
 
Q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
1
Q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
2
Q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
3
Q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
4
 
Q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
5
Q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
6
Q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
 
7
A
g
e
F
a
t
h
e
r
'
s
 
a
g
e
T
e
l
e
p
h
o
n
T
V
P
C
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
S
u
b
j
e
c
t
H
o
w
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
y
o
u
 
d
e
f
i
n
e
 
y
o
u
r
 
c
o
n
c
e
r
n
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
v
.
?
H
o
w
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
 
d
o
 
y
o
u
 
t
h
i
n
k
 
e
n
v
.
 
I
s
s
u
e
s
 
r
e
a
?
A
r
e
 
y
o
u
 
a
 
m
e
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
a
n
 
a
s
s
o
c
 
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
d
 
i
n
 
e
n
v
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
?
H
o
w
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
 
d
o
 
y
o
u
 
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
 
 
e
a
c
h
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
a
t
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
s
 
o
f
 
a
n
 
e
c
o
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
?
Recyclable
Use of ecological 
production 
Prod. using 
renewable 
resources
Prod. using 
toxic/dangerous 
materials  
H
o
w
 
m
u
c
h
 
d
o
 
y
o
u
 
k
n
o
w
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
G
h
a
n
a
’
s
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
s
i
t
u
a
t
i
o
n
?
A
s
 
f
a
r
 
a
s
 
y
o
u
 
k
n
o
w
,
 
G
h
a
n
a
’
s
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
s
i
t
u
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
…
H
o
w
 
m
u
c
h
 
R
 
U
 
a
w
a
r
e
 
t
o
 
d
a
n
g
e
r
s
 
o
f
 
p
e
s
t
i
c
i
d
e
 
r
e
s
i
d
u
e
s
 
i
n
 
f
r
e
s
h
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
?
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
5
3
2
3
2
7
6
5
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
5
2
3
2
2
2
6
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
2
2
3
3
2
5
4
4
3
2
3
6
2
1
0
1
1
4
1
1
2
1
1
1
4
3
3
3
2
8
6
8
1
1
0
1
5
1
1
2
1
1
1
3
4
4
3
3
1
1
1
1
6
3
1
2
1
4
4
3
6
5
6
1
1
0
0
7
2
2
2
1
2
1
5
2
3
3
2
1
5
0
1
1
1
1
8
1
1
2
1
1
1
5
2
2
1
3
4
1
0
1
1
9
1
1
1
 
-
 
F
o
E
3
1
2
5
1
3
3
2
5
5
8
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
2
1
2
3
1
2
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
2
4
3
2
3
4
8
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
3
5
4
3
1
2
2
7
9
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
2
2
1
2
5
2
4
1
2
5
1
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
1
 
-
 
G
e
o
l
 
S
t
u
d
 
A
s
s
o
c
i
1
1
1
4
2
3
1
2
3
7
2
1
1
0
1
1
5
2
1
2
1
3
3
1
1
8
4
0
1
1
1
1
1
6
1
1
2
1
1
1
5
2
3
1
2
3
5
3
1
1
1
1
1
7
1
1
2
1
1
1
5
2
3
1
2
3
5
3
1
1
1
1
1
8
2
1
2
2
1
2
5
5
2
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
9
2
1
2
1
1
1
2
2
3
2
2
2
6
2
1
1
1
1
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
1
.
4
2
1
.
1
6
1
.
4
7
1
.
1
8
1
.
3
8
4
.
4
0
2
.
6
3
3
.
1
1
2
.
0
6
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
o
c
i
o
-
d
e
m
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
a
w
a
r
e
n
e
s
s
 
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
n
a
i
r
e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
G
e
o
l
o
g
y
 
s
t
u
d
e
n
t
s
 
s
e
s
s
i
o
n
)  27
III. Organic bananas production - scenario provided to participants in the experiment 
Banana cultivation is an important source of foreign exchange in tropical countries in Latin 
America, the Caribbean and Africa29. The economic gains are immediate and seemingly 
constant as it is a plant which grows quickly and can be harvested all year round. But these 
advantages are not priceless. According to Yamileth Astorga30, bananas cultivation – a perennial 
crop which has established itself as intensive and mono-cultural – requires the following 
inputs: large amounts of land, tight control over the amount of water, shallow systems of canals 
and drainage ditches, high levels of fertilisers and pesticide application, careful attention to de-
leafing, de-suckering and maintenance and a substantial labour-force.  
The environmental and human consequences are, thus, not marginal. One of these concerns 
arises from the issue of genetic uniformity. In fact, there are more than 300 varieties of bananas 
in the world; yet, as the most popular ones in the North are the Cavendish-type bananas, most 
producers shift to this plant (47% of production)31, creating a genetically homogenous banana 
market which is, by definition, a more vulnerable and less resilient eco-system. Other, more 
straightforward, environmental impacts include deforestation (due to continuously expanding 
plantations), soil depletion (due to intense cultivation without rotation) and water and soil 
pollution (due to intensive use of pesticides). Indirect consequences include intensification – 
quality and quantity wise - of floods (due to deforestation processes), and the creation of huge 
amounts of wastes (e.g. plastic bags to protect the bananas from disease, the remains of trees)32. 
Although traditional banana growing in West Africa has originally given a lot of attention to 
environmental and social concerns, with the rise of industrial agriculture and mainly with the 
competition with big multinationals, such traditional, greener, methods were abandoned to 
accommodate more chemical-intensive growing techniques. In Ghana, a relatively small 
                                                 
29 FAO, (2003), The World Banana Economy 1985-2002. Rome: Food and Agricultural Organisation.  
30 Astorga, Y. (1998), The Environmental Impact of the Banana Industry: A Case Study of Costa Rica. 
International Banana Conference, Brussels 4-6 May.  
31 FAO, (2003).  
32 Astorga, Y. (1998).    28
exporter (though not producer) of bananas - though not comparable to the mining or cocoa 
sectors - the bananas sector is in constant growth33. 
Volta River Estates Ltd. (VREL) Organic is an organic-fair-trade banana plantation on the 
banks of the Volta River, near Akosombo. In 2003, after three years of intensive research, 
planning and development, the company started producing bananas which were not only fair-
trade but also organic (with the brand name eko-oké). They employ 720 people which are 
constantly involved in management decisions. They receive support from the Ghanaian 
government, a Dutch fair-trade company.  Their bananas are mainly destined to export, but 
some of the fruit reaches also local markets in Accra, Tema and Aflao34.   
In a typical cost-benefit-analysis framework, a shift to more sustainable organic techniques 
would entail the following costs and benefits. Please consider these factors when answering the 
survey: 
Costs Benefits 
•  Involves high initial costs of R&D    •  Diversifies the economy, reducing its 
dependence on gold and cocoa exports 
•  Often requires assistance from public 
authorities or external bodies (as in the 
VREL  case, the Dutch NGO) 
•  Saves money on chemical pesticides and 
fertilisers 
•  Involves costs of education and training to 
local framers 
•  Guarantees a smaller negative impact on the 
environmental and natural resources (e.g. 
no use of chemicals and fertilisers, reduced 
waste; protection of flora and fauna) 
•  Bananas export - in general - depends to a 
large extent on the European Community 
banana import regime, which implies some 
uncertainty for suppliers 
•  Guarantees long term environmental and 
economic sustainability  
•  Takes long time to convert the land into 
organic 
•  Safer in terms of workers’ health  
  Beneficial in term of human capital creation 
and R&D output  
                                                                                                                                                              
33 FAO, (2001).Contribution of Bananas to Income, Employment and Food Security in Ghana and Ecuador. 
Committee on Commodity Problems, Intergovernmental Group on Bananas and on Tropical Fruits, Second 
Session. San José, Costa Rica, 4-8 December. 
34 Information obtained from http://www.vrelorganic.com/.   29
 
IV. List of the pairwise choice lotteries 
$0 $1 $3 $4 $0 $1 $3 $4 
0 0 1 0  0.2  0 0  0.8 
0.75 0 0.25 0  0.8  0  0  0.2 
0.3 0.6 0.1  0 0.32  0.6  0 0.08 
0  0.6 0.1 0.3  0.02  0.6  0 0.38 
0 1 0 0  0.7  0 0  0.3 
0  0.5 0.5  0 0.35 0  0.5  0.15 
0.5 0.5  0  0 0.85 0  0 0.15 
0 0  0.7  0.3  0.15  0 0  0.85 
0.8  0 0.14  0.06  0.83 0  0 0.17 
0.2  0  0.74 0.06 0.23  0  0.6  0.17 
0 0.2  0.8 0  0 0.5 0 0.5 
0.5 0.1 0.4  0  0.5  0.25 0 0.25 
0  0.2 0.6 0.2 0.2  0  0.4 0.4 
0  0.1 0.3 0.6 0.1  0  0.2 0.7 
0.2  0.8 0  0 0.8 0  0 0.2 
0.1 0.4 0.5  0  0.4  0  0.5 0.1 
0 0.4  0.6 0 0.4 0  0 0.6 
0.5 0.2 0.3  0  0.7  0  0  0.3 
0  0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2  0  0  0.8 
0  0.2 0.7 0.1 0.2  0  0.4 0.4 
0  0  0.5 0.5 0.1  0  0  0.9 
0.5 0 0.5 0 0.6 0  0 0.4 
0.25  0.5  0.25  0 0.3  0.5 0 0.2 
0 0.5 0 0.5  0.2  0.2 0 0.6 
0.5  0.25 0 0.25  0.6 0.1  0  0.3 
0 0.25  0.5  0.25 0 0.35 0 0.65 
0  0 0.75  0.25 0  0.1  0.25  0.65 
0.25 0.25  0.5  0  0.25 0.35  0  0.4 
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V. List of lotteries in the price session 
Lottery  $0 $1 $3 $4 Lottery  $0 $1 $3 $4 
1  0 0 1 0 29  0.2  0 0 0.8 
2  0.75  0 0.25  0 30  0.8  0 0 0.2 
3  0.3 0.6 0.1 0  31  0.32  0.6 0  0.08 
4  0  0.6 0.1 0.3 32  0.02  0.6 0  0.38 
5  0 1 0 0 33  0.7  0 0 0.3 
6  0 0.5  0.5  0 34  0.35  0 0.5  0.15 
7  0.5  0.5  0 0 35  0.85  0 0 0.15 
8  0 0 0.7  0.3  36  0.15  0 0 0.85 
9  0.8  0  0.14 0.06 37  0.83 0  0  0.17 
10  0.2  0  0.74 0.06 38  0.23 0  0.6  0.17 
11 0  0.2 0.8 0  39  0  0.5 0  0.5 
12 0.5 0.1 0.4 0  40  0.5 0.25  0  0.25 
13 0  0.2 0.6 0.2 41  0.2 0  0.4 0.4 
14 0  0.1 0.3 0.6 42  0.1 0  0.2 0.7 
15  0.2  0.8  0 0 43  0.8  0 0 0.2 
16 0.1 0.4 0.5 0  44  0.4 0  0.5 0.1 
17  0 0.4  0.6  0 45  0.4  0 0 0.6 
18  0.5  0.2  0.3  0 46  0.7  0 0 0.3 
19 0  0.2 0.3 0.5 47  0.2 0  0  0.8 
20 0  0.2 0.7 0.1 48  0.2 0  0.4 0.4 
21  0 0 0.5  0.5  49  0.1  0 0 0.9 
22  0.5  0 0.5  0 50  0.6  0 0 0.4 
23  0.25 0.5  0.25 0  51  0.3  0.5  0  0.2 
24 0  0.5 0  0.5 52  0.2 0.2 0  0.6 
25  0.5  0.25 0  0.25 53  0.6  0.1  0  0.3 
26  0  0.25 0.5  0.25 54  0  0.35 0  0.65 
27  0  0  0.75 0.25 55  0  0.1  0.25 0.65 
28  0.25 0.25 0.5  0  56  0.25 0.35 0  0.4 
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VI. Comparing hypothetical questions results with incentive-based results  
 
CV 415.39 230.78 316.83 131.48
Experiment 613.85 205.31 475.29 122.02
Calibration facor 0.6767 0.6666
Market Price* ~ 600 ~ 600
S.D.
* Market price is not precise as it depends on the size of the banana as well as on the 
quantity of the bananas bought
Average price
Organic Bananas Non Organic Bananas
Average price S.D.
 
 
Note that the average price obtained in the incentive compatible experiment is higher than 
the CV average price in both organic and non-organic sessions. Comparison of simple 
averages yields calibration factors of 0.674 and 0.668 for organic and non-organic treatments, 
respectively. Note, moreover, that S.D. is always higher in the CV surveys. Finally, it is worth 
pointing out that the price elicited through the incentive compatible experiment is closer to 
market price. More precisely, the experimental price is higher than the market price for 
organic bananas (hence displaying the willingness to pay an environmental premium) and 
lower for non-organic bananas. In the CV surveys the average price is always lower than 
market price. 
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